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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come now the appellants respectively named in 
the above entitled causes and petition the Court for a 
rehearing in said cases and each of them. 
Your petitioners respectfully represent that the 
Court in its Opinion erred in the following particulars: 
1. In failing to consider on the facts in these cases 
the issue as to the constitutionality of Section 80-5-57, 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, if such statute is construed 
as permitting the inclusion of premium payments in com-
puting net annual proceeds. 
2. In holding that there was "no substantial differ-
ence between the present cases and those earlier decided 
by us,'' and in effect holding the decisions in such cases 
to be controlling here. 
3. In failing to consider Section 81-1-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943, in view of the admitted facts in these 
cases that premiums were paid after a sale of ores upon 
quotas established subsequent thereto. 
4. In failing to give effect to the fact presented in 
these cases that premium payments were continued 
after ceiling prices on metals were removed and that 
petitioners at such times reported to the Tax Commis-
sion the amount received upon the open market and not, 
as the Court states, the ceiling price. 
5. In failing to follow the elementary rule of 
statutory construction that where ambiguity as to tax 
liability exists, the doubt should be resolved in favor of 
the taxpayer. 
'VHF~RJ<JFORJ:i~ appellants pra.v that this petition 
be granted and that upon rehearing the decision of this 
Court heretofore made and entered be vacated and the 
judgments of the Lower Courts be reversed. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
In the face of a unanimous decision, to petition any 
court for a rehearing is doubtless comparable to 
"tapping the deck of a troop ship with your cane 
to stop the engines when you are seasick." 
Nevertheless, for the reasons above enumerated and here-
inafter considered, we feel under a duty, not only to our 
clients but to the Court, to so petition: 
Not only is it true (and never more so than in this 
day of changing ideas and when established institutions 
are under question) that as Judge Wolfe has written 
"The purity and integrity of the judicial pro-
cess ought to be protected against any taint of 
suspicion to the end that the public and litigants 
may have the highest confidence in the integrity 
and fairness of the Courts.'' 
It is equally true that confidence in the thoroughness and 
impartiality of the Courts must be preserved to insure 
respect for their decisions. 
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I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER ON 
THE FACTS IN THESE CASES THE ISSUE AS TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 80-5-57 U. C. A. 1943, 
IF SUCH STAT UTE IS CONSTRUED AS PERMITTING THE 
INCLUSION OF PREMIUM PAYMENTS IN COMPUTING 
NET ANNUAL PROCEEDS. 
This Honorable Court in its opinion makes no refer-
ence to the most basic issue in the net proceeds cases, 
namely, the constitutionality of the statute if that statute 
is to be construed as permitting the inclusion of premium 
payments. 
As we pointed out in our original brief (pages 42 to 
46), and as is clear beyond question upon the record pre-
sented in the present cases, subsidies are the exact oppo-
site of net proceeds. They represent not what a mine is 
capable of earning, but what in addition to earnings is 
necessary to be expended for the continued operation of 
amme. 
Our statute defines value a.s the amount at which pro-
perty would be taken in payment of a just debt from a 
solvent debtor. 
The Constitution requires equality of taxation. 
To say that a mine would be taken in payment of 
a just debt from a solvent 'debtor at a value arrived at 
by including premium payments as net proceeds is to 
say what every man with any familiarity with the facts 
Ln c \'.'f'. 1 o hr erroneous. 
Surely this Honorable Court does not by its silence 
wish to be understood m; rc~;arding the constitutional 
right of the hundreds of stockholders in Utah mines to 
equality of tax treatment with other taxpayers a.s unde-
serving of it.s consideration. 
Surely also this Honorable Court does not assume 
that such stockholders are ignorant of the fact that as 
costs increase, values diminish. 
As the record here .shows, repeated and detailed ap-
plications to the Quota Committee were made by the 
various a ppellant.s and quotas were fixed and revised 
on the basis of costs, and the higher the costs the more 
the premiums received to compensate. 
While the constitutional provi.sion is applicable only 
to the net proceeds cases and not to the occupation tax 
cases, we respectfully submit that this Court should not 
fail to consider it or fail to give its reasons for such deci-
sion as it may make upon it. The Haynes case involved 
a record showing wholly different facts and therefore is 
not applicable here. 
II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS 
"NO SUBSTANTIAL DIIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE PRES-
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ENT CASES AND THOSE EARLIER DECIDED BY US", AND 
IN EFFECT HOLDING THE DECISIONS IN SUCH CASES 
TO BE CONTROLLING HERE. 
In its opinion, this Honorable Court states that: 
''We are unable to determine any new points 
or questions now being advanced which were not 
presented to us for consideration in the earlier 
actions, with the possible exception of the fact 
that the subsidies continued for some period after 
the ceiling price on the metals was removed. This 
one additional factor is not of controlling import-
ance.'' 
And the Court states that: 
"We have no desire to foreclose appellants 
from presenting matters which were not litigated 
in the previous cases. The only burden we place 
on them is to establish that the matters presented 
in these suits are essentially and substantially 
different from those passed on in the previous 
litigation." 
Far from there being only one ''additional factor'' 
as the Court states, the present cases differ materially 
from what are referred to as the ''earlier actions.'' 
The only matter in common between the present 
cases and the earlier cases is that they both involve the 
inclusion of subsidy payments in computing the occupa-
tion tax and the net proceeds valuation of mines for pur-
poses of the general property tax. 
In the cases previously considered by this Court, 
quotas were based upon mine production in 1941; ''pre-
miums" were paid on account of excess production over 
production in Hl41. Quotas were not tied to current costs 
of production; were not adjusted to take account of retro-
active costs; subsidies were not paid on the ba.;;is of a 
quota revised and established after sale of ores. 
In the occupation tax cases, this Court speaking 
through Mr. Justice Wade based its decision specifically 
on original Rule 13 which was .subsequently rescinded, 
and upon specific facts in the records of the cases then 
before it as distinguished from what might have been 
in other cases then not before the Court. The Court itself 
adopted this line of reasoning. 
In the net proceeds cases, this Court based its de-
ci.sion on the specific facts which it found from the rec-
ord in those cases that premiums were only paid on a 
sale of ores or when the ores had been converted into 
the equivalent of money. But in the present cases the 
records do not permit of holding that any ores have been 
converted into the equivalent of money, the allegations 
being specifically to the contrary. Therefore if in the 
present net proceeds cases it is to be held that the pre-
mium.s are includible in computing net proceeds, it must 
be found as a fact that they were paid only on a sale of 
the ores, since there was no conversion of the ores into 
the equivalent of money. But likewise the subsidies here 
were not based upon sales either! 
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We do not understand the court's comment to the 
effect that amended Rule 13 "was the foundation for 
many of the arguments of appellants in the previous 
ca.ses"; those cases were submitted upon a stipulation 
of facts which did not contain amended Rule 13. (We 
may add that the stipulation did not contain such 
amended rule because counsel were not aware at the time 
the stipulation was entered into that original Rule 13 
had been rescinded.) 
In contrast with the earlier cases, here in summary 
are the factors presently before this Honorable Court 
for consideration: 
1. No question of the conversion of ores into the 
equivalent of money is involved. Con.sequently with rele-
vance it 'cannot be said, as the Court nevertheless now 
does, that the language in the Haynes case "broadened 
the scope of the former as the later decision holds that 
for 'net proceeds tax' purposes there need not be a sale 
of the metals to include the subsidy payment in the tax 
ba:.se.'' 
It is specifically alleged in the present net proceeds 
cases that there was no conversion of the ores into the 
equivalent of money. 
2. Quotas are tied neither to a prior year's produc-
tion nor to ceiling prices. On the contrary, they are tied 
to costs of production and are revised upwards or down-
wards as experience demonstrated to be requisite to in-
'.sure continued production. They were revised retro-
actively and premiums were paid on the basis of quotas 
!) 
established after a sale of ores and pursuant to a dis-
cretionary act of the Quota Committee; such payments 
obviously were nothing which the company was even 
legally entitled to receive at the time the ores were sold 
but depended upon the subsequent action of the Quota 
Committee. 
3. Premiums were paid after all controls and ceil-
ing pricea were removed and in such instances the 
amounts received on the open market for ores sold were 
reported to the State Tax Commission as the amounts 
received on sales. 
4. Neither in the act of Congress authorizing the 
payment of premiums, nor in any regulation applicable 
to the present cases is there a single word indicating an 
intention that the payment of premiums shall be condi-
tioned upon or deemed to be a part :of the moneys re-
ceived on, a sale of ores, the basis of the earlier occupa-
tion tax case decision of this Court. On the contrary, the 
relevant regulations expressly provide for payment of 
premiums when excess production has been determined. 
III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER SEC-
TION 81-1-1 U. C. A. 1943 IN VIEW OF THE ADMITTED 
FACTS IN THESE CASES THAT PREMIUMS WERE PAID 
AFTER A SALE OF ORES UPON QUOTAS ESTABLISHED 
SUBSEQUENT THERETO. 
Unless Section 81-1-1 of our Code, setting forth the 
common definition of a sale, is to be utterly disregarded 
-----------------------------------
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(and this Honorable Court in its opinion makes no ref-
erence to it), then in order to hold that premiums were 
received on a" .sale of ores", and therefore were properly 
includible under the Legislature's language in computing 
the occupation tax and net proceeds valuation, it must 
be found that they were received "on account of a trans-
fer of the property in the goods to the buyer.'' This is 
the Legislature's language. 
Under the allegations in some of the complaints now 
before this Court, and which for present purposes must 
be accepted as true, certain premiums were paid on the 
ba.sis of quotas fixed after a sale of the ores. 
The Quota Committee had discretion in rev1smg 
quotas; it did revise quotas to take account of retroactive 
labor costs, and to compensate for increased costs over 
those on which quotas had originally been fixed. 
We respectfully submit that it is a logical impos-
sibility to assert that something to which a person had 
no right at the time of a sale of ores still was received 
by him on account of a transfer of the property in the 
goods to the buyer. 
All premiums were paid pursuant to the same Fed-
eral authority. When it appears that some premiums 
were paid under these facts, it must be difficult to 
believe that premiums were part of what was received on 
11 
a ";sale of ores." This is the Legislature's wording, not 
ours. 
IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE EFFECT 
TO THE FACT PRESENTED IN THESE CASES THAT PRE-
MIUM PAYMENTS WERE CONTINUED AFTER CEILING 
PRICES ENDED. 
In its opinion this Honorable Court says that the 
one fact presented in the present cases, additional to 
those presented in the earlier cases, is that subsidies 
continued for some period after the ceiling price on the 
metals was removed. And the Court ;states "this one 
additional factor is not of controlling importance." 
As we have endeavored to point out, this one factor 
is far from being the only additional factor. Certainly 
it is of much less importance than the further additional 
fact that subsidies in some cases were paid on quotas 
established after a sale of ores. Al;so the fact that sub-
sidies continued independent of prices was called to the 
Court's attention on rehearing, but the Court stood by 
the original decision on the basis of the records in those 
cases. 
Neverthless, we submit that it i;s not a fact which 
should be disregarded without explanation: 
As this Honorable Court states in the earlier cases, 
subsidies were tied to ceiling prices, and in those cases 
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relying upon original Rule 13 the Court held that the 
''premiums'' plus the ceiling price represented the pur-
chase price of the ores. 
We now have a sale of ores on the open market, and 
the payment of subsidies based upon quotas tied to de-
termined costs of production. These subsidies are not 
tied in to either ceiling prices or to a previous year's 
production. 
To hold that the .subsidies under such facts are re-
ceived "on a sale of the ores", we submit, requires that 
we disregard Section 81-1-1 as well as the obvious reali-
ties. If such an argument is "tenuous", after all it arises 
and is based upon the very distinction made by the major-
ity opinion in the Combined Metals Case. If, a.s is now 
suggested, that difference is not of substance, since the 
Court's original argument was tenuous, then it would 
seem indeed that the earlier decisions are injudicious 
and should be frankly overruled. 
These differences and distinctions are not ours. 
v. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE 
ELEMENTARY RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
THAT WHERE AMBIGUITY AS TO TAX LIABILITY 
EXISTS, THE DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR 
OF THE TAXPAYER. 
In an attempt to view this whole matter from our 
position as officers of the Court and not mere advocates 
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of our clients' cause, we can follow the predicament of 
the present court up to the point where on page 5 of 
its opinion the basis of the majority in the Combined 
Metals Case is really abandoned and the views of Mr. 
Justice Wolfe are before the Court. The problem then 
indeed becomes that of either overruling the former 
decisions, or sustaining sweeping tax liability upon Jus-
tice Wolfe's theory. 
Your Honors then unanimously state, as did only 
Mr. Justice Wolfe in his Combined Metals Case opinion: 
''a good case could be made for including a pre-
mium payment in the tax base and conversely () 
a good case could be made for excluding the pay-
ments." 
What, then, is the guide to show the Court which of these 
two possibilities it should follow~ The beacon that, as 
a rule of law, should be known to Bench and Bar alike 
in lighting our paths. The facts are not in dispute. It 
is a question of statutory construction to determine the 
intent-the "legislative mind"-of Utah's legislature 
when in 1937 and before it enacted the law3 now facing 
Utah's citizens and the Bench and Bar. 
The rule applicable, it would seem, is one of long 
standing and based upon sound reasons of policy. It 
might be termed elementary, having been expounded 
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long ago by this Court in common with the judiciary 
and text-writers for generations without dissent. 
We need turn only to Mr. Justice \Volfe's masterly 
opinion in Norville v. State Tax Commission, ~)8 Utah 
170, 97 P. 2d 937, where it is stated: 
''The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in 
case of doubt as to the intention of the legislature, 
to be construed strictly against the taxing author-
ity and in favor of those on whom the tax is levied, 
has been well set out in the case of Helvering v. 
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 
50, 79 L. Ed. 211. See, also Los Angeles & S. L. 
R. Co. v. Richards, 52 Utah 1, 172 P. 474; W. F. 
Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 
Utah 359, 61 P. 2d 629, 107 A.L.R. 261; 25 R. C. L. 
Sec. 307 at p. 1092; Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11, 
4th Ed. Sec. 503 at p. 1113." 
Section 27 of Article 1 of our State Constitution 
states: 
''Frequent recurrence to fundamental princi-
ples is essential to the security of individual rights 
and the perpetuity of free government." 
There has been no more fundamental principle m 
our system of jurisprudence and public law than that 
tax statutes should be construed strictly in favor of the 
taxpayers. In Utah, starting with the case of Kerr v. 
Woolley, 3 Utah 456, 24 P. 831, decided in 1866, there has 
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been no rule better recognized by an unbroken Hne of 
decisions through and including the Norville case, supra. 
"Now, it is an established rule that all statu-
tory modes of executing any laws, or any power 
under a law, must be strictly pursued: A. D. M. 
Turnpike Company v. Guild, 6 Mass. 44; Franklin 
Glass Co. v. White, 14 Id. 286; 3 U. S. Dig. 43, 
sec. 30. 
* * * * 
"The supreme court of the United States has 
decided, Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 
436, upon this question of taxation and kindred 
ones, that the rule of construction is against the 
corporation and in favor of the public, and neither 
the right of taxation nor any other power of 
sovereignty will be held to have been surrendered 
unless such surrender has been expressed in term.s 
too plain to be mistaken. 
"To the same effect are Billings v. The Pro-
vidence Railroad Bank, 4 Vet. 561 ; Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 I d. 420; Girden v. 
The Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; The Rich-
mond Railroad Company v. The Louisiana Rail-
road Co., 13 Vet. 71; and many other cases of 
the highest authority, all of which enjoin a strict 
construction and execution of all such powers. 
"It is wholly unnecessary to multiply cita-
tions as to the strict construction of the power 
in question and the class to which it belongs. But 
for this rule of strictness, the remedies in all such 
cases might at last come to depend upon the mere 
caprice of parties, in the unbridled discretion 
of the .courts." Kerr vs. Woolley, supra. 
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For other recent statements of this basic rule, we cite: 
Howard, Gould, Plff. in Er-r., v. Katharine C. Gould, 
245 U. S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53, 62 L. Ed. 211: 
"In the interpretation of statutes levying 
taxes it is the established rule not to extend their 
provisions, by implication, beyond the clear im-
port of the language used, or to enlarge their 
operations so as to embrace matters not specifi-
cally pointed out. In case of doubt they are con-
strued mo.st strongly against the government, and 
in favor of the citizen. * • * '' 
Edison California Stores v. McColgan, (Calif.) Jan. 
17, 1947, 176 P. 2d 697: 
" * * * courts, in interpreting statutes levy-
ing taxes, may not extend their provisions, by im-
plication, beyond the clear import of the language 
used, nor enlarge upon their operation so as to 
embrace matters not specifically included. In case 
of doubt, construction is to favor the taxpayer 
rather than the government. * * * " 
And see 51 Am. Jur. "Taxation" Sec. 316. 
It is respectfully submitted that right here is the 
underlying and inherent error of thi.s entire subsidy 
series of decisions to date. If such is the case, it would 
still seem to be the duty of this Court-despite any em-
barrassment from overruling prior decisions which Fed-
eral Courts have had to follow-to choose that "possi-
17 
bility" which the law of statutory construction points 
out as proper. 
True, the decisions as they now stand create liability 
for more taxes to be paid the State of Utah by a well-
nigh prostrate industry. But to allude to the old Greek 
legend-if the State of Utah is to win this race-after 
the Tax Commission itself conceded it in the early years 
by following this basic rule of construction-will the 
torch of justice under the law in the hands of the winner 
·still be alighU 
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